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ERIC BURTON
Socialisms in Development:
Revolution, Divergence and Crisis, 1917–1991

This special issue appears on the occasion of the centenary of the October Revolution. It deals with the interrelationship of two phenomena that are, historically, closely related with this event: socialism and development. Among the people who were inspired to change the destiny of their own country by means of revolution and socialism is Ali Sultan Issa, a politician from Zanzibar. Issa had come to embrace Marxism during his stay in the United Kingdom through contacts with the Soviet-dominated Communist Party in London, which he joined in 1953. In 1957, he visited the Moscow Youth Festival, the event that is usually viewed as the onset of the Soviet Union’s opening to the world and the intensification of efforts to export its own model of development to the global South. Becoming a “major architect of Zanzibar’s socialist movement” (Burgess 2007: 265), Issa also travelled to China, Ghana and Guinea. He named three of his children after the revolutionaries and leaders of state socialism he most admired (Burgess 2009: 58). A daughter born in 1961 was called Fidela, after Fidel Castro. His third daughter, born in 1962, was called, in reverence to Mao Zedong, Maotushi. Issa sent young Zanzibaris to East European countries and Cuba to ensure that the revolution he was expecting could be guided by a well-trained, socialist-minded avant-garde. After the birth of Fidela and Maotushi, Zanzibar achieved its independence from the British in 1963 and had its own revolution in 1964. For eight years to come, Issa set out to build the new Zanzibar and create the socialist ‘New Man’ by drawing on the experiences and support of socialist countries, including China, the Soviet Union and East Germany. As a cabinet minister, Issa was now part of the forces administering revolution from above – if necessary, through force and repression. This was about 10 years
after Khrushchev had initiated a course of de-Stalinisation, denouncing
the terror and cult of personality his predecessor had instigated. Still, Issa’s
son born in 1966 received the name Stalin.

The entanglement of Issa’s cosmopolitan biography and the history
of Zanzibar illustrates not only the transnational pathways of socialism,
but also the plurality of models and the different ends these models could
be used for – most notably, revolution and state-led development. The
historical cases of the Russian, and, later, the Chinese revolution appealed
to educated elites in the colonies, because they set an example of how
predominantly agrarian-based societies could “attain [...] unity, wealth,
and international respect” (Donham 1999: 123) and bring about a moral-
social order based on solidarity instead of competition. The October
Revolution in 1917 brought the first “real life alternative to capitalism”
into existence (Cleaver 1992: 233); other socialisms, whether by revolu-
tion or peaceful transition, followed. One third of the world population
came to live under state socialism proper, characterised by family resem-
brances including far-reaching nationalisation, centralised economic plan-
ing, and the monopolisation of power in the hands of a Communist
party (Becker 2009: 27; Hobsbawm 2011: 345). Beyond these similarities,
socialism itself developed as it was creatively adapted to changing local and
global circumstances. In Africa alone, “no fewer than thirty-five countries
out of fifty-three proclaimed themselves ‘socialist’ at one or other point in
their history” (Pitcher/Askew 2006: 1). As new states of socialist orientation
emerged, their models had to come to terms with colonial legacies – most
notably a highly asymmetrical integration into the capitalist world market –
which rendered radical transformations more difficult (Becker 2009). All
these varieties of socialism, most of them elite and top-down phenomena
rather than mass-based movements, had an impact on how development
was conceptualised and on thinking about how transformations could be
achieved, even in capitalist countries.

To some extent, this two-way relationship between the phenomena of
development and socialism(s) is common knowledge, but, in the history
of development, it has remained neglected. Most introductions to the
history of development refer to Rostow’s ‘Anti-Communist Manifesto’
and the importance of the Cold War, but take little note of socialist
models, practices and experiences of development, especially as far as the
‘Second World’ is concerned (see, for instance, Chari/Corbrigde 2008; Fischer et al. 2016; Rist 2008). Such a history of socialist development and developing socialisms is, however, an integral part of a shared history of “North-South-East-West relations” (Grandner/Sonderegger 2015). There is a need, in the words of Joseph Hodge, for “a more global and transnational investigation of ideas and linkages beyond the Western [experience],” contributing to a “more diverse, ambiguous, and fractious portrait of development’s past” (Hodge 2016: 125). The objective of this special issue is to contribute to a global history of development that takes note of the variety and interrelations of socialist experiences, highlighting both cooperation and competition between socialisms in the wake of decolonisation and the Cold War.

The articles in this volume focus on East-South and South-South relations (East Germany – Cuba – Africa; Soviet Union – Africa). They analyse how socialist strategies of development were adapted to apply to internal peripheries (Central Asia in the case of the Soviet Union), instrumentalised by regimes adhering to a Marxist-Leninist ideology (Ethiopia) and resembled industrialisation strategies in other countries (Mexico). The authors deal with examples of how models travelled and were translated (cf. Bierschenk 2014: 76) and how people and ideas circulated between diverging and converging socialisms. All of the case studies are situated in the latter half of the “short twentieth century” which began with the October Revolution in 1917 and ended with the implosion of state socialism in the Soviet camp in 1989-91 (Hobsbawm 1994).

The following historical sketch aims to provide further context for an interdisciplinary readership to the relationship of different varieties of socialism and development. It is divided into three periods. In the period of Seeds of revolution (1917–1945), the model of state socialism took shape and spread, even though concrete applications remained confined to Mongolia and the former Russian empire that was now being refashioned as the Soviet Union. In the period of Divergence and competition (1945–1973), a variety of socialisms was put into practice in newly independent countries of the global South, many of which diverged from the Soviet model of state socialism. The period of Socialisms in crisis (1973–1991) begins with a geopolitical and ideological upswing, but is ultimately marked by structural economic constraints. Socialisms, invariably situ-
ated in the periphery and semi-periphery, became increasingly dependent on the capitalist core for survival. With few exceptions, they collapsed or morphed into state capitalist projects.


The October Revolution in 1917 was a global moment, making socialism a global project (see Marung, this volume). Still, Lenin’s hopes that the revolution would spread like a wildfire from the Russian periphery to the Western European centres of industrial capitalism proved to be a dead end in 1922. Finding themselves in the unexpected situation of still having no socialist allies, the Bolsheviks came up with the first socialist strategy of economic development, marked by a heavy bias towards industrialisation. Through planning and socialisation (which, almost everywhere, meant nationalisation) of the means of production, they sought to overcome problems like unemployment and social inequality that marked capitalist societies (Becker 2009: 15). Lenin’s New Economic Policy of the 1920s did, however, contain a heavy dose of market mechanisms. Only under Stalin was the theory of “primitive socialist accumulation” eventually put into practice, entailing the collectivisation and (re-)subjugation of the peasantry to provide the surplus for financing the country’s industrialisation. This extractive (and, in many cases, conflictive) relationship of the state vis-à-vis the peasantry also marked later experiences of socialism.

As far as Europe was concerned, the interwar period also brought about the definitive, and lasting, split between communists and social democrats, with the latter choosing reform over the complete break with liberalism through revolution (Newman 2005: 46). The Comintern, established in 1919 initially to further proletarian world revolution, increasingly became Stalin’s foreign policy instrument and was finally dissolved in 1943.

Still, the seeds of socialism spread. They were falling on particularly fertile ground in the minds of intellectuals from the colonised world (Wemheuer 2016: 13-14). Africans from the continent and the diaspora flocked to Moscow, the “Red Mecca”, to witness how socialism had overcome exploitation and racism (McClellan 2007). In comparison with colonial territories – in some
of which communist networks emerged (Drew 2014) – or the United States, the Soviet Union indeed seemed progressive. Circles close to the communist movement in Paris or London also became breeding grounds for anticolonial activists from Asia, Africa and Latin America (Adi 2013; Goebel 2015). Intellectuals and future nationalist leaders like Gamal Abdel Nasser, Jawaharlal Nehru, Ho Chi Minh and Mao Zedong studied Soviet models and experiences, either in Moscow or from a distance (Hilger 2017: 160-161). They used these insights in the nationalist liberation struggles and would establish their own brands of socialism after World War II. Although all of them also drew from a variety of sources that had little or nothing to do with socialism according to the understandings developed in the European tradition, many would have agreed with Nehru’s words that capitalism was no alternative in solving the problems of the (post-)colonial condition: “I see no way of ending the poverty, the vast unemployment, the degradation and the subjection of the Indian people except through socialism” (cited in Cleaver 1992: 233). It took the end of colonial rule to turn socialism from a strategy of revolution to a strategy of development.

2. Divergence and competition:
The age of development and decolonization, 1945–1973

After World War II, the Soviet model of state socialism was installed in Eastern Europe; it also expanded to East Asia. Some regime changes and communist revolutions would soon prove uncontrollable for Moscow; both China and Yugoslavia came up with ‘heretic’ models of development (Maoism, worker’s self-management) that questioned the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy established by the Soviet Union (Hobsbawm 1994: 232). In a process that was intermingled with the dynamics of the Cold War and decolonisation, real existing socialism evolved from a Soviet-dominated project to a pluralised and fragmented one. With the rise of the “age of development” (Cooper 2010), countries in the global South made political, financial and material claims.

As opposed to state socialism in Eastern Europe and East Asia, mushrooming varieties of ‘African socialism’ in Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Tanzania, and ‘Arab socialism’ in Egypt, Syria or Iraq were marked by
their leaders’ reluctance to employ Marxist rhetoric, Leninist vanguardism in party organisation, and dirigist economic planning. Pragmatic cooperation with ‘bourgeois’ groups both inside and outside the country and an emphasis on national unity (and, sometimes, ‘tradition’) sat uneasily with the Marxist-Leninist emphasis on class struggle as the driving force of progress. In terms of foreign policy, these states kept a distance from the Soviet Union (although the manoeuvring spaces which Cold War competition provided allowed occasional rapprochements). Much of this may be seen as an outcome of structural conditions, as these countries found themselves in a peripheral position in the world market, with neither an industry nor a working class deserving that name (Becker 2009).

The Sino-Soviet split is particularly instructive in this regard, not only because of the recent academic debate it has inspired, but also for its global dimension and consequences. The split was preceded by intense cooperation and exchange. After the Chinese revolution in 1949, the Soviet Union heeded Mao’s request for assistance, provided loans and dispatched roughly 10,000 Soviet advisors and experts who disseminated the High-Stalinist model, including disciplining techniques like the Gulag-style work camps in order to foster infrastructural growth (Kaple 2016). Yet as early as 1956, the year in which Khrushchev’s de-Stalinisation campaign took off, Mao emphasised that “we mustn’t copy everything indiscriminately and transplant mechanically” (cited in Bernstein/Li 2010: 2). As the Soviet Union abandoned Stalinism and turned towards consumer-based socialism, Mao went further down the road towards radicalism. The revolutionary drive to catch up with the industrialised powers culminated in the failure and famines of the “Great Leap Forward” (1958-1961). Mutual estrangement between Chinese radicalism and Soviet pragmatism (or ‘revisionism’, as the Chinese would have it), was the result (Lüthi 2008). The Sino-Soviet split finally occurred in 1960 as bilateral economic relations collapsed and all Soviet personnel were called back. The Chinese henceforth treated the Soviet Union as “negative teaching material” — how not to do socialism (Bernstein/Li 2010: 2).

Until the mid-1970s, China would claim to be the legitimate leader of what then came to be called the ‘Third World’ (an ambitious – and unfinished – project, not a place, cf. Prashad 2008), promoting its own models of revolution and development. The chief divergence of the ideological
models was the relationship between the means and ends of revolution, based also on differing interpretations of global antagonisms (Friedman 2015). The Soviets believed that anti-imperialism was a means to combat capitalism and achieve socialism. In their view, the world was divided into progressive socialist and reactionary capitalist forces. Something like a ‘Third World’ did not exist in this bipolar vision. For the Chinese, on the other hand, who emphasised their shared historical experience of colonialism within the ‘Third World’, anti-imperialism took precedence over anti-capitalism. From this perspective, socialism was not an end in itself, but a means to do away with imperialism and white supremacy. Their view was that of a world divided into a rich, ‘white’ North and a poor, ‘coloured’ South, with the ‘white’ Soviet Union being part of the imperialist North that also threatened China. While China, as far as global relations were concerned, emphasised racial hierarchies, the Soviet Union stuck with class as the world’s principal antagonism. Both powers claimed to free the world from exploitation, yet the question as to whether that exploitation on a global level was primarily based on (Western) capitalism or (Northern) imperialism was a bone of contention. China accused the Soviet Union of being a white imperialist power, prioritising its détente policy towards the West and thereby betraying the cause of anti-imperialist liberation. The Chinese challenge of an anti-imperialist revolution to the Soviet anti-capitalist revolution found wide resonance in leftist circles, especially in the global South.

The success of Fidel Castro’s guerrilla movement in 1959 lent further impetus to a militant, revolutionary, anti-imperialist and outward-looking kind of socialism. Over the following decades, Fidel Castro repeatedly angered Moscow with his independent, ‘adventurist’ actions and interventions in Africa and Latin America (Gleijeses 2006). Cuba cooperated with Algeria, and both countries became hubs of socialism and exporters of radical ideals and professional revolutionaries, trying to instigate socialist subversion (Gleijeses 2002; Byrne 2016). This combative and confrontational internationalism was at odds with the Soviet emphasis on ‘peaceful coexistence’ and efforts to win the Cold War on the non-violent, economic rather than military plain.

David Engerman (2011: 199) has drawn attention to the fact that Western ‘development aid’ and Eastern European ‘socialist aid’ (or ‘soli-
darity’) were in many regards similar, departing as they did from a number of common assumptions. Both subscribed to the newly emerging system of international relations (with its key characteristics of national sovereignty and national interest), regarded the spread of their own system as a success, and believed that the world was, inevitably, moving in the same direction. There are also striking resemblances in the structure and purpose of aid. Governments mainly worked through state agencies to apply technical expertise and implement large showcase projects. Both envisaged the state as the main actor in development and planning (cf. Scott 1998), fostered industrialisation (cf. Pettinà/Kalinovsky, this volume) and tried to pull receiving countries into their own trade networks to supply markets and resources.

Still, there were differences between ‘capitalist’ and ‘socialist’ practices and conceptions that should not be overlooked. The ruling elites of the newly independent countries were quick to test the material substance of the anti-imperialist rhetoric of socialist countries – and used Western aid as a yardstick. In quantitative terms, on a global level, socialist aid could never rival Western aid, which roughly amounted to 10 times its amount (Engerman 2011: 199). Many instances of ‘East-South’ cooperation were fairly intense, but brief. They lacked a substantial economic basis in the form of trade and were marked by failures of the industrialised socialist countries to provide concessional loans or implement projects to the satisfaction of their partners (see, for instance, Boden 2006). Soviet efforts to export its model of industrial development to West African countries between 1957 and 1964, focussing on the creation of heavy industry (and, consequently, a working class as political avant-garde), were short-lived and led to mutual disillusionments, after which the USSR paid greater attention to ideology (Iandolo 2012; Friedman 2015: 78-83; Mazov 2010).

In her contribution to this special issue, Steffi Marung shows how the Soviet Union tried to gain ground in this global ideological struggle against challenges from both the ‘right’ (liberalism, social democracy) and the ‘left’ (Maoism) in the 1960s and 1970s. Africanists played a key role in the double movement of theoretical innovations (e.g., concepts like the ‘non-capitalist path of development’ and ‘multistructurality’) and the selective framing of Soviet history. They highlighted that the USSR had faced – and mastered – problems very similar to those that postcolonial
African countries encountered in the present. Visitors from Africa were not only taken to attend academic conferences in Moscow, but also to witness socialism’s performance in transforming the Soviet Union’s internal post-colonial space in Central Asia.

Such sites of exchange and strategies of knowledge transfer were significant. Lacking the economic muscle (hard currency and up-to-date technology in particular) to outcompete Western ‘technical aid’ and loans, socialist countries leaned heavily on cultural cooperation. Between 1960 and 1991, around 43,500 students from sub-Saharan Africa received education in the Soviet Union alone, with other substantial scholarship programmes developing in the countries of Eastern Europe and, a decade later, in Cuba (Burton 2016; Katsakioris 2011; Rupprecht 2015; Saint Martin et al. 2015).

China, with its agrarian-based economy and few opportunities to offer education, clearly overburdened itself with the provision of material aid, making up over 5 per cent of its budget in the early 1970s (Friedman 2015: 198). Much of this was for the construction of the ‘freedom railway’ from the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to the mines of the Zambian copper belt, one of the few Chinese projects that have been studied in detail (Monson 2009). The Sino-Soviet conflict was also played out in Zanzibar. Ali Sultan Issa remembered being impressed with the sincerity of the Chinese “brothers” to help even though they were “backward”, while “the Russians were advanced with Sputnik and everything, yet they were stingy” (cited in Burgess 2009: 107). Following the disappointment in relations with West Africa, Soviet foreign policy, towards Africa at least, had already entered a period of pragmatism and careful spending (Matusevich 2009: 1263). This partially explains why East Germany and not the Soviet Union was China’s main rival in Zanzibar. However, just like Czechoslovakia (which enjoyed a larger degree of autonomy until 1968), East Germany was more than a proxy of the USSR. Recent archival studies have found that by providing aid to left-leaning liberation movements and states in the global South, Eastern European countries often pursued national (economic, political, prestige) rather than Eastern Bloc interests (Muehlenbeck 2016; Slobodian 2015). While ideological and political struggles (and motives) predominated in the period of divergence, economic interests would take centre stage in the period of crisis.
3. Socialisms in crisis:
The return and fall of Marxism-Leninism, 1973–1991

Although state socialist countries in Eastern Europe (and, to some degree, East Asia) were less integrated into the capitalist world market than countries of socialist orientation in the global South, they were neither able to globalise nor to modernise their economic model (Sanchez-Sibony 2014). Consequently, they could not escape the effects of the oil crisis, global recession and the technological limits of their mode of production and “dug their own graves” by resorting to easy loans that became available as oil dollars swamped the capital market (Hobsbawm 1994: 251; see also Kotkin 2010; Bini et al. 2016).

Trade became more important in East-South relations. Increasingly, the East had to pursue a ‘realist’ trade policy with a focus on the import of strategic raw materials and the export of industrial products and technology (Lorenzini 2014; Döring 1998). In contrast to earlier efforts to export a socialist strategy of industrialisation, this form of trade resembled and perpetuated the colonial international division of labour. Economically, “Soviets’ allies and dependents never walked on their own feet” (Hobsbawm 1994: 250), and Eastern European policy-makers increasingly pointed out the economic burden of their political exercise in ‘solidarity’. Mozambique’s request to join the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in 1981 was flatly turned down. In 1990, two thirds of Soviet debt claims were owed by ‘friends’ like Cuba, Vietnam, Syria and Ethiopia (Friedman 2015: 219).

In his contribution to this special issue, Andreas Admasie interprets the Ethiopian strategy of socialist development (1974–1991) as a version of “economism” (Charles Bettelheim), similar to the one inaugurated by Stalin. Focussing on the nascent manufacturing sector that was seen as a key to socioeconomic development, Admasie shows the contradiction between the emancipatory Marxist rhetoric and the coercive push for hastened accumulation which not only failed to bring about the desired increase in productivity, but also created a “labour regime far harsher than that of pre-revolutionary times”.

The cover of this issue is taken from these years. It stems from the journal Dehnenet (“Security”), issued by the Ethiopian Ministry of
National and Public Security. While the upper half of the image shows a vision of development – agricultural and industrial production with a disciplined workforce – the lower half depicts how the enemies of socialism are kept in check. It thus alludes to the dark dimensions of coercion and repression without which any history of socialisms would be incomplete.

The economic crisis of socialism, which, unlike the strong security apparatuses, was a major factor for its demise, struck observers relatively late. Politically, in the mid-1970s, socialism – especially in its Soviet-leaning varieties – seemed to be on a winning streak. As the US withdrew from Vietnam (1975), the breakdown of Portuguese imperialism brought to power liberation movements that, like the military regime which wrested power after the Ethiopian revolution, espoused Marxism-Leninism. One reason for this embrace is that non-Marxist versions of socialism had evidently failed to unshackle the young nations from the grip of the capitalist world market and neo-colonial interventions; also, many proponents of ‘African socialism’ and ‘Arab socialism’ had become victims of internal divisions and coups. They entered a close relationship with the USSR, as China had already abandoned its radical posture and was now ‘opening up’. The Revival of leftism in general and Marxism-Leninism in particular was interrelated with an intensification of the Cold War between East and West. Many of the new regimes – Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Nicaragua – saw their countries turn into hot spots of the global Cold War. Where efforts to implement social revolution were made, these were impeded, as protracted civil wars fuelled by superpower intervention and the destabilisation policies of neighbouring right-wing regimes broke out (Westad 2007).

Despite military conflicts and continuing liberation struggles (for instance in Southern Africa), the model of revolutionary socialism became less attractive. The largest part of the ‘Third World’ had achieved formal independence by the mid-1970s and now joined hands to unite as the ‘global South’ against the economically unequal relations imposed by the ‘global North’ (Prashad 2013). China and Cuba had, to some extent, succeeded as models for revolution, but certainly not as models of economic development. Following Mao’s death, China let go of its claims to act as the leader of a global anti-imperialist socialist revolution. Cuba, however, continued with its internationalism, albeit in a transformed way. As Berthold Unfried
argues in his contribution to this volume, Cuba became a central hub of interaction in the socialist world system. Showing how Cuba and East Germany cooperated and extended their cooperation to the African continent, he postulates a “Cuban cycle of developmental socialism” that lasted from 1972 until 1990, producing novel flows of persons and resources. Within the socialist world system, Cuba also acted as a reminder to put political over economic aims as it continued to push the COMECON’s industrialised member states into substantiating its anti-imperialist mission rhetoric with actions.

Still, the question of the economic foundations remained and became more pressing. Vanni Pettinà and Artemy Kalinovsky show in their contribution to this volume that the model of state-led industrialisation – as a tool to manage populations and increase welfare – did fulfil some of its social objectives, but reached its limits in the 1980s and was abandoned. Comparing the cases of Mexico and Soviet Tajikistan from the 1920s to the 1980s, they conclude that – although the reasons for the abandonment of earlier industrialisation concepts differed – the newly evolving strategies were remarkably similar: scholars, politicians and planners were in favour of rolling back the state and emphasising individual entrepreneurship. The findings of Pettinà and Kalinovsky resonate with Johanna Bockman’s (2013) argument that neoliberal ideas also took shape within the socialist world.

While this argument has been debated, the fate of real existing socialism is well-known. By the 1980s, almost all governments that were still attempting to find a viable ‘socialist’, ‘revolutionary’ or ‘non-capitalist’ path of development were forced by internal and external pressures to abandon socialism and initiate socioeconomic transformations, bequeathing a wide variety of post-socialisms (Fischer/Parnreiter 1997; Pitcher/Askew 2006; Ther 2014). With few exceptions, these transformations dismantled the pillars of socialist development and led to the abandonment of socialist ideals.

Like so many individuals who were part of these transitions, Ali Sultan Issa, too, had let go of most of his Marxist ideals. Changed through his years in prison in the 1970s, he reembraced Islam and “devoted himself to reconstructing his life through trade and entrepreneurship, rather than politics” (Burgess 2009: 10). Issa, together with other comrades-turned-reformers, demanded political and economic liberalisation and was the
first, cooperating with Italian investors, to build a hotel in Zanzibar in the 1980s and pave the way for his country to become a major destination of international tourism. As he said of himself, “I am now a member of the petit bourgeoisie, exploiting the labour of others.” (cited in Burgess 2009: 155). His children Maotushi and Stalin meanwhile go under different names, and only Fidela has continued to honour her father’s past decision and still carries her original name.

Save for a few enclaves fighting for survival, state socialism has become a rare plant, threatened by extinction. The leaders of China’s communist party have become fairly successful disciples of capitalism, as have those of Angola’s MPLA or Mozambique’s FRELIMO. Latin America’s ‘twenty-first century socialism’, with its last remaining outpost in Venezuela, is already on the verge of entering history as these lines are being written. Socialism has been relegated, as before the October Revolution, to grassroots movements and opposition parties. The crisis of socialism remains unresolved, and so do the structural contradictions – social and global inequality, exploitation, unemployment, sexism and racism – which socialist strategies of development have set out to overcome, with all their ambivalent outcomes, ranging from unprecedented advances in social welfare to mixed results in the political and economic realm, to outright humanitarian disasters.

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2 My periodisation follows Hobsbawm (1994) and Cooper (2010), with the slight difference that Cooper’s “age of development” already begins in 1940 – which makes sense for his focus on colonial development, but is less convincing in the case of socialist development.

3 Algeria and Yugoslavia were among the actors trying to promote the Third World as an open political project that should be based on a shared outlook rather than a common, non-white identity (Byrne 2016). The debate over race and class had, of course, multiple sources and sites (another being, for instance, pan-Africanist traditions of thought), and it has been continued between Marxists and adherents of postcolonial studies ever since (Wemheuer 2016).
References


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